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ABSTRACT

Turkey’s goal of being accepted by the West began with the “westernization” of
its culture in the 1830’s under the Ottoman Empire’s sultanates. Turkey’s application to
the EU is the newest aspect of Turkey’s westernization project, and its potential
membership represents a complete acceptance of its modern, secular identity, both as a
people and as a state. The decision of membership is not only important for Turkey’s
evolution, but also the European Union’s. The identities of both are at stake; the
evolution of each will depend greatly on the course taken by the other. This paper argues
that it is best for both the EU and Turkey that Turkey’s accession process continues in a
more open and translucent manner; that the EU treats Turkey’s case as it did the other
candidate countries, with the same restrictions, goals and demands; that Turkey fully
comply with the EU’s demands regarding reform of social and political aspects; and that
Turkey becomes a member in the next ten years. This is possible if Turkey feels that
membership is truly a possibility. The consequences of isolating or frustrating Turkey to
the point of a withdrawal of their membership process would be great, for both parties
involved. Turkey wants to be a member of the West. To reject this desire is to accept
detrimental consequences for the EU’s relationship with Turkey, the Middle East and the
Muslim world.
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Introduction
While some debate the identity of Turkey, since 1923, there has been no doubt
within Turkey that Turkey belongs to the West. Turkey’s continued integration
throughout the past 50 years – economically, militarily, politically – has resulted in
Turkey’s membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
multiple trade agreements with regional partners, including a Customs Union with the
European Union (EU). For the Turkish government, the next step for Turkey’s alignment
with the West is membership in the political entity of the West, the EU. Turkey first
applied in 1959; while the enthusiasm of both parties has wavered throughout the years,
Turkey still remains committed to the accession process.
This paper analyzes the Turkish-EU relationship from various perspectives. First,
the paper looks at Turkey’s reasons for wanting to be a part of the EU, which includes
political, economic, historical, cultural and identity reasons. The second section traces
EU-Turkish relations since 1959, focusing on the perspectives of each country in their
actions towards one another. Turkey was traditionally viewed as a security partner; in
times of lesser danger, such as after the Cold War, Turkey’s importance to Europe
decreased, whereas in times of heightened risk of attack or danger, Turkey’s importance
increased. This spectrum of views continues today, and influenced the EU’s decision to
accept Turkey’s membership request in 1999. This section also covers the situation as it
is now. Turkey is growing frustrated with its treatment by the West, both the EU and the
US, because of various issues, including the Cyprus problem, the Kurdish issue and the
question of the Armenian genocide. Section three explains and refutes some main

6

arguments against Turkey’s membership. These includes the idea that Europe has reached
its absorption capacity and cannot integrate Turkey; that Europe will be threatened by
waves of migration; that Turkey is not European and therefore should not be a member of
the EU.
Section four analyzes the benefits to the EU if Turkey becomes a member. The
most important of these is that the EU can expand its security, defense and foreign policy
with Turkish membership. Turkey is a geopolitically strategic country that borders many
areas of security importance for the EU. Also, the EU’s goals of becoming a globally
dominant actor are reliant on their continued expansion of policy, which includes Turkish
membership. The benefits for Turkey if it joins the EU are found in section five, and
include the benefit that the ideological ties the current government has with the EU and
the West brings to the Turkish people through the reforms enacted thus far; the economic
benefits of being a member of the EU economic powerhouse; and the security benefit of
secure alignment with the West instead of acting as a buffer between the EU and other
regions.
Finally, section six analyzes the possibility of Turkey not joining the EU. The
ambiguity of the EU towards Turkey’s membership is a source of frustration for many
Turks; many view the EU as applying a double standard to Turkey’s accession process.
Combined with a historical distrust of the West, many hold low opinions of the EU and
the West in general. If such a trend were to continue, manifesting itself must strongly if
the current government were to lose power, it is possible that Turkey would turn away
from the EU. Three options are presented in such a situation: turning to Islam and
integrating into the Middle East; accepting the role as a benevolent regional power in the
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Middle East, aligned with neither the West nor the Middle East; or turning to Russia as a
‘second Europe’. Of these options, the role of a benevolent regional role is most likely.

Research Methods
This paper compiles research from various sources. The author interviewed
experts of different aspects of the Turkish-EU relationship, including Sinan Ulgen, the
chairman of a think tank in Istanbul (EDAM), Professor Harry G. Tzimitras of Bigli
University, Professor Roland Dannreuther, a specialist in geopolitics of Russia and
Central Asia, as well as others. Many of the articles were found through the Centre for
Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (CEPS) website; other information was also found
from another think tank in Istanbul, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
(TESEV). Research relied heavily on newspaper articles, academic articles and published
works by Turkish authors to gain a better idea of both perspectives of the situation.

Section 1: Reasons for Turkey’s desire to be a member of the EU
After the demise of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the future of
the formerly vast empire as well as the Middle Eastern region was unknown. The
European countries eyed the lands hungrily; the Arabs desired their own countries, free of
Western influence or rule. From this torn region came a Westernized, democratic Turkish
Republic, led by Mastufa Kemal, a revolutionary leader with the goal of modernizing the
country of the Turks to attain equality with the dominant Western countries. Such a
movement was implemented through a change in Turkish society’s standards and norms,
reaching so far as to band the fez, the traditional headgear of the Ottoman Empire era,
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and encourage a Western style dress code. Also included in this shift to the West was the
implementation of a Western style democratic government. The application to the
political dimension of the West, the EU, is a continuation of the Kemalist, modernizing
principles that established the Turkish Republic.
Turning to the West has been an integral part of the Turkish mindset since the
formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The construction of the identity of modern
Turkey was based on the understanding that there was a “universal validity of Western
modernity” that could be applied to Turkey. 1 Turkey was one of the founding members
of the United Nations in 1945. In 1952, Turkey joined NATO and cemented its position
as an important player in the Western military structure. Continued close relations with
the West have established Turkey’s role as a Western oriented, modern state, an identity
contrary to many of the other nation states in the same geographical areas. Turkey’s
geographical location, a juxtaposition of Eastern and Western cultures, surrounded by
various different regions, created and still creates a problem of identity. To which area, to
which identity, does Turkey belong? Ataturk’s answer was that Turkey belonged to
Europe, to modernity, and away from the backwards, undeveloped neighboring regions.
Turkey’s current identity is tied to this ideal of modernity and democracy, and as a result,
to the ideal of the West: the European Union. Already a member of the military wing of
the West, the next step to reaffirm such an identity is membership to the political aspect
of the West. Such an acceptance of not only Turkey’s military but also political aspects
represents an acceptance of Turkey’s identity.

1

Kemal Dervis, Daniel Gros, Michael Emerson, Sinan Ulgen European Transformation of Modern Turkey
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004), 10.
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This desire to belong to the West is coupled with a strong sense of unjust and
unequal treatment from European powers since the establishment of the Turkish
Republic. The Sevres Treaty that was enacted after the end of World War I was seen by
the Turks as an attempt by the European powers to put an end to what is modern day
Turkey, to effectively erase their country from the map. This fear of dismissal and
suspicion of the West still resonates within Turkish culture, and creates a strong demand
for fair treatment and recognition as a member of the European Union rather than only as
a military ally. 2 Turkey’s enthusiasm for their membership bid is tempered by these
memories of the Sevres Treaty, which establishes a fear of losing national sovereignty
without gaining European sovereignty. 3 Turkey wants to be treated on an equal basis, and
believe one way of securing this in the future is through political status via the European
Union.
There are other elements to Turkey’s bid to the EU. Economically, there is not as
significant a gain for Turkey as for other new members as a Customs Union between
Turkey and the EU has been in effect since 1995. However, the increase in investors’
confidence in the country, its viability as a recipient of foreign direct investment and less
restricted trade would benefit the country’s economy. Politically, EU membership is of
great interest for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the current government in
power. Further democratization of the country’s politics is an integral part of their party’s
platform; many point to the EU as “an anchor” for their democratization efforts. 4 Also,
the AKP is an Islamic political party; it is in their interest for Turkey to become a
2

Ibid, 7.
Ibid 17.
4
Senem Aydin and Rusen Cikar, “Political Islam in Turkey” in Political Islam and European Foreign
Policy: Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean. ed. Michael Emerson and Richard
Youngs (Brussels: CEPS, 2007), 124.
3
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member as this would demand more religious freedoms from the national government
through the acceptance of the communitaire acquis, and therefore allow more Islamic
representation and activity in Turkish culture. 5

Section II: A Summary of EU-Turkish Relations since 1959
Turkish-EU relations through the past decades depended on the lens through
which the European Union viewed Turkey. Turkey’s first request for membership came
in 1959, seven years after having joined NATO, the military component of the West. At
that point, the EU was still the European Economic Community (EEC), and was not yet
prepared to expand to such a geographically distant country. The European Community
offered the Ankara Treaty as an alternative, which Turkey accepted; this Treaty was
signed in 1963. 6 Politically, Europe had little interest in expanding membership
throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The Western European bloc was, however, content to
treat Turkey at that time as a security partner. By the 1970’s, the EU had expanded and
were willing to accept new members. However, even after the restitution of democracy
post military coup in the early 1970’s, Turkey did not apply for full membership, which
according to Prof. Harry G. Tzimitras, is where Turkey made a crucial mistake. At that
point, the EU still viewed Turkey and the rest of the world through a security perspective
and so Turkey still held importance in that regard for the EU. In regards to qualifications
for membership, the European Union had moved towards an emphasis on
democratization and human rights, which allowed for the newly restored democracy in

5

Interview with Prof. Harry G. Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008.
The Ankara Treaty created an outline for creating a customs union, as well as expressing membership as a
long term goal.

6
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Greece to apply for and attain membership. 7 With such a security perspective and
emphasis on democracy, which was newly reinstated in Turkey, Turkey should have
applied for membership at this time, and probably would have been accepted. 8 However,
Turkey did not apply. By the early 1980’s, Turkey experienced another military coup,
ruining any subsequent bid in the near future on the basis of the lack of democracy and
human rights. 9 This emphasis was formally recognized in 1993 with the declaration of
the Copenhagen criteria.
In the 1990’s, the European Union shifted its attention to finance and economics.
This coincided with the implementation of the Single European Market and a halt in the
enlargement process, as well as the world wide reverberations following the end of the
Cold War and the EU’s main security concerns. Having little to offer economically and
with a decrease of interest in security with the end of the U.S.S.R. threat, Turkey’s 1987
application stalled. No longer “sexy” in security terms, Turkey was largely forgotten
until the First Gulf War. 10 Then, with the shift back to a traditional security perspective
with the advent of a war in a nearby region, Turkey became more important to the West,
exemplified by the long awaited establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and
the European Union that had been planned since the signing of the Ankara Treaty in
1963. This move was strongly supported by many who at that time wanted to postpone or
withdraw from accession talks, such as France. The creation of the Customs Union with
such strong European support was seen in Turkey as both as a strong step forward and a
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Greece officially joined in 1981.
According to the opinion of Prof. Harry G. Tzimitras, interview 6 Nov 2008.
9
There was little chance that an EU membership bid would work in the early 1980’s, as the EU suspended
the Ankara Association in 1982 in response to the coup d’etat in 1980.
10
Interview with Harry G. Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008.
8
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way to keep Turkey aligned with the West without fully embracing the country as a
member.
In 1997, at the Luxembourg Summit, the EU quite clearly spurned Turkey. It was
at this summit that the states for the eventual 2004 enlargement were discussed and
decided; Turkey, the country with the most ties to the EU, was not included on the
eventual list of candidate countries. 11 In response, Turkey froze relations with the
European Union until 1999, at which point Turkey was accepted as a candidate country
and declared “destined” to become a member. 12 This lock on candidacy status gave the
Turkish government the political and social support to implement a series of drastic
reforms throughout the years which were demanded by the European Union for
membership. 13
In 2001, the Turkish government passed a series of 34 amendments to the national
constitution that extended new or strengthened existing civil rights. This series of reforms
included the shortening of pre-trial detention periods, limiting the use of the death penalty
only in times of war or to perpetrators of terrorism, guaranteeing more rights to the
political parties and a general expansion of civil rights. The civil code was amended in
January 2002 to expand gender equality in the wider society and extend more protection
for children under the law. In order to adapt the Turkish code to the general European
acquis, various “Harmonization Packages” were adopted starting in December 2002, the
11

Turkey’s long standing relationship included the 1963 signing of the Ankara Agreement and the
establishment of the Customs Union in 1995. No other country included on the candidate list that year had
a comparable agreement.
12
EU Expansion Commissioner Gunther Verheugen declared after the Helsinki Summit that “Turkey is a
candidate country destined to join the European Union.”
13
The most basic of these requirements are called the Copenhagen Criteria, which require states to have
achieved basic stability of democratic institutions, a functioning market economy that can function within
the larger European markets, and the ability to take on the “obligations of membership” in regards to
political and economic requirements. These criteria were established at the Copenhagen European Council
in 1993.
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first of which including increased amounts of freedom of expression and association, an
expansion of human rights and minority protection, and loosening of restrictions on
minority expression and use of other languages, such as Kurdish, in public society. These
reforms were followed by more and more waves of change which were bolstered by
Turkish enthusiasm for EU membership. In 2003, Turkey abolished any use of the death
penalty, and measures were passed to restrict military influence on civilian aspects of
governance. May 2004 saw the reform of the judiciary, which had previously been
severely lacking, and also an increase of civil control over the military. The
implementation of these reforms is overlooked by the Human Rights boards, and Reform
Monitoring groups in the government 14
The issue of implementation of said reforms is of great importance to both
Turkey’s bid for membership and the Turkish people. There is a long way to go yet in
regards to protecting minorities, implementing torture bans, truly reforming the judiciary
and offering the adequate training for a reformed judiciary. Also, increased oversight
over the military’s actions as well as a more complete separation of military and civil
power needs to be put into place. Incomplete or improper implementation is one of the
concerns for Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. In order to silence these
critics and truly accept democratic reform, those fears and complaints need to be
addressed. This need for Turkey’s reforms to be realistically functional is recognized by
AKP party officials, and steps have been taken to increase the effectiveness of reforms. 15

14

For more information on Turkey’s reforms, please see Senem Aydin and Fuat Keyman’s article,
“European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy” in Turkey in Europe Monitor, eds.
Michael Emerson and Senem Aydin, (Jan 2004 – Feb 2005), 65-75.
15
For more information, look at Aydin and Cakir’s chapter in Political Islam and European Foreign
Policy’s interviews with AKP party officials. Pg 113 – 134.

14

In October 2005, official negotiations began for Turkey’s membership. While this
was a big step, many wonder how long Turkey will have to wait for its official
membership to begin; if membership is an actuality instead of a possibility in the far
future, what is the cost that Turkey must pay? Clashes with the West about the Kurdish
question, the issue of defining the Armenian genocide, and the role of Islam in society
have not helped this mood of increasing frustration. 16 An issue that has driven a wedge
between Turkey and the EU has been the Cyprus problem; while Turkey voted yes to the
U.N. sponsored Annan Plan and has complied with EU requests, many in Turkey feel that
Turkish Cypriots have not been treated fairly. Their willingness to comply and
compromise on the issue was dismissed with the acceptance of Cyprus into the EU in
2004; now without the incentive of possible EU membership, there is little likelihood that
the Greek Cypriots will be willing to work on any solution to the problem. 17
Meanwhile, the issue of defining the Armenian genocide has also played an
important role in souring relations between the West and Turkey. France passed a law
stating that it is a crime to deny that genocide occurred against the Armenians under the
Ottoman Empire in 1915. 18 The reasons for such a bill were political; however, the Turks
were extremely dismayed that a foreign government was willing to venture into such
domestic policy. 19 When a similar bill came before the US Congress, Turkey’s reaction
was similar, with many Turks outraged by the U.S.’s actions. The government warned the

16

See Sinan Ulgen’s article from the Herald Tribune, “Dangerous frustration is creeping in” as an example.
Interview with Professor Harry G. Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008.
18
Dan Bilefsky, “Turks Seething over French bill on genocide,” The International Herald Tribune, 16 Oct
2006, Europe. www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/16/news/turk.php.
19
Suat Kiniklioglu, “Mind Your Own Business, France,” The International Herald Tribune, 19 Oct 2006,
Opinion, www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/19/opinion/edkinik.php.
17
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U.S. that such a move would endanger the U.S-Turkish relationship. 20 The U.S. and
Turkey are strong military partners. However, the Turks see this assertion as a stain upon
the national honor and refuse to label it genocide. Any state’s assertion that it was
genocide is certain to create tension with the Turks, and decrease its popularity with the
Turkish government and people.
Reforms have slowed as the public support for EU membership has dropped. The
government has not made it its top priority as in its first years in power; the mood from
the EU is one of ‘wait and see.’ This is not popular with the Turks, who feel that they are
doing everything they can to comply with EU standards, while other countries are
accepted. The acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, almost fifty years after
Turkey’s first application, did not help the public opinion of Europe within Turkey.

Section III: Arguments against Turkey’s membership
There are many logistical problems with accepting such a large, relatively poor
country such as Turkey. These problems are also all interrelated, to the degree that “it is
not the financial costs or migration pressures, or size or demography, or the power shift
in favour of cohesion countries alone that stimulate anxiety… Rather, it is the
combination of all these factors…” that makes Turkey’s accession process so difficult. 21
Following are some of the main arguments against Turkish accession:

20

Sebnem Arsu and Brian Knowlton, “Turks warns U.S. against resolution on Armenian genocide,” The
International Herald Tribune, 30 March 2007, News & Features section,
www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/30/news/turkey.php.
21
Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser, “Turkey’s Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context
and Implications for Europe” in European Foreign Affairs Review 10 No. 2 (2005).
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The difficulties of integrating a highly populated country
Demographically, Turkey has a larger population than most other European
Union member states, which create tension in regards to power within the different EU
branches. Turkey is a unique country in that “[is] too important to exclude [from the
EU], but extraordinarily difficult fully to include without overstraining the capacities of
the institutions [it seeks] to join.” 22 The large population would drastically shift the EU to
become an entirely different entity. Its impact on the Council and European Parliament
would be great, as voting power in both entities is based on population. This concerns
those countries who continue to hope for continued political integration. The logistics of
creating a functioning political entity representing such a large population is daunting and
almost unrealistic with the expansions in 2004 and 2007. However, the issue of political
integration has faded. There will be no United States of Europe, as some once imagined.
Even so, Turkey’s large population creates fears that it would overwhelm the current
system or change it beyond recognition. Turkey’s role in the European Union is widely
debated and hinges on the future of the EU. Turkey also has a choice in its style of
membership, just as many current members act through different functions. There are
those that are more integrated as many of the ‘old European’ countries, or those that
choose to not participate in some aspects, like the UK. 23 The current system can adapt,
just as it did in 2004 and 2007; Turkey is a large country, but the EU is not an
unchangeable entity.

22

William Wallace, “From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to Tigris? The Transformation of the
EU and NATO,” International Affairs, 76 No. 3, (2000), 399-400.
23
Kirsty Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” in Turkey in Europe
Monitor eds Michael Emerson and Senem Aydin (Jan 2004 – Feb 2005),53.
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Overwhelming migration to other EU member states
Some argue that the membership of Turkey and its large population will lead to
massive waves of migration to other EU states, specifically those states, like Germany,
that already have a large Turkish population. This fear of an inundation of Turks seeking
work is unrealistic. Yet, some argue this hypothetical wave of Turkish workers would
cause instability within member states, through increasing income inequality, calls for
political representation that would tip the political power towards European-Turks, and
significant changes to national identity. 24 However, these dramatic forecasts for the
future if Turkey becomes a member are not even applicable as there are permanent
restrictions on the freedom of Turkish persons 25 ; instead of acting as viable arguments,
these claims ring of racism and fear of a changing population. The media has consistently
portrayed Turkey’s membership as the catalyst for mass immigration from Turkey to the
rest of Europe; however, this is not even a possibility. In the years to come, as the
population of EU member states age, the Turkish youth that need work might be
welcomed to maintain the EU’s economic capacity.

Identity – Is Turkey European?
Turkey’s accession process has sparked debate of what exactly is European.
Former French President Giscard d’Estaing claims that "Turkey must never be allowed
into the European Union ... since it has a different culture, a different approach, a
24

These ideas are found in “Just Say No”, by Paul JJ Welfens. He also argue that Turks could immigrate to
the point where Germany would prefer to leave the EU to deal with its internal problems, therefore ruining
one of the basic goals of the original Commission of creating peace in Europe through Germany’s
involvement.
25
European Commission, Accession negotiations with Turkey: negotiating framework (Brussels, Oct
2005).
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different way of life” is not indicative of all Europeans, but certainly represents a certain
faction of Europeans who agree. 26 Others fear that if Turkey joins, the EU will lose its
Europeaness, which has already been diluted since the 2004 enlargement. Such a broad
definition that would include Turkey, which traditionally has been the ‘Other’ for
Europeans, could create a rise in nationalistic movements in older member states as they
reject the new European identity that includes Turkey. 27 At the very least, there could be
an increase in tension between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’. The rise of the EU within
the borders of old Christianity reestablishes the historical tensions that have existed for
centuries, first between the Ottoman Empire and the rest of Europe, and currently
between the new EU and the rest of the neighboring region. These tensions create a fear
of envelopment, dilution, dissipation of an identity, which is already aggravated by
European’s fear of losing their national identity through integration into the EU.
However, many forget that EU identity and European identity are separate entities;
European identity is based on historical and cultural ties and is a subjective matter,
whereas European Union identity is easier to identify through membership to the regional
organization and was created because of economic interest of individual nation states. 28
Professor Tzimitras claims that EU identity is still submissive to national identities as
well as European identities; Switzerland and Norway are European states, but not
members of the EU. EU identity and European identity are not identical, and so Turkish
membership to the EU should not affect the European identity.

26

See “Turkey demands talks on joining EU,” The Guardian, 27 Nov 2002.
Ali Tekin, “Future of Turkey-EU Relations: a civilizational discourse.” Futures 37 No 4 (May 2005), 5.
28
Interview with Harry Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008.
27
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Section IV: Benefits for the EU if Turkey becomes a member
The European Union’s identity has changed through the years. What originally
began as a coalition of economically interested partners has transitioned into a larger
entity, more of a supranational organization than a loose collaboration of separate,
sovereign nation states. As states concede more of their national sovereignty to the EU,
they also concede aspects of their national identity to a more general EU identity. The
2004 ten state enlargement and subsequent addition of two more countries in 2007 29 have
substantially changed the composition of the EU, affecting its functions, activities and
possible future roles. Turkey’s accession would change the EU; however, as the EU itself
is changing, the changes brought by Turkey are not detrimental but positive for the
changing EU identity. As the Council General of Sweden in Istanbul Ingmar Karlsson
states,
“The new enlarged European Union will for the foreseeable future be a political
and economic union with valuable geometry, concentric circles, and different
speeds. What objection is there to Turkey’s incorporation into such a union,
particularly in view of the fact that, with its geographical location, its size, and its
decades-long membership of NATO, Turkey is a strategically important partner,
which by itself would enhance the role of Europe in global politics more than the
ten new members combined?” 30

The EU holds great diplomatic capability, a strong membership of nation states
who hold high representation in many international organizations, a strong hand in the
29

Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007.
Ingmar Karlsson, “Turkey’s Cultural and Religious Heritage – An Asset to the European Union,” in
Turkey in Europe Monitor, eds Michael Emerson and Senem Aydin, (Jan 04-Feb 05), 84.
30
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global economy, and most importantly for Turkey, the EU has the potential to become a
major global player. This potential role requires a strong military presence in a world
where hard power is still a key component to any dominant amount of influence on world
events. The EU has already taken steps towards becoming such a power by increasing its
role in conflict resolving dialogue, supplementing regional integration and cooperation
with the European Neighborhood Policy and establishing the foundations for a common
security and defense policy (ESDP). Turkey is an integral part of this new global player
role, and greatly increase the EU’s geopolitical and military strength. According to
Professor Dilek Cinar, the EU cannot become a major global player without Turkey; to
deny Turkey is to isolate Europe from its neighboring regions, and thereby denying
Europe any potential global leadership role. 31
Turkey’s role in expanding Europe’s global standing is multifaceted. The
expansion of the European Union’s borders to the neighbors east of Turkey – Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Armenia, Georgia – would give Europe more influence in the region and legitimize
actions taken by Western powers in the area. Turkey has improved relations with these
countries, as well as those in the Caucasus, in the past couple years and could offer the
EU their services as a third party negotiator to help with inter-regional dialogue.
Europe’s interaction with the Middle East, one of its “most serious security interests,”
could use Turkey’s growing diplomatic power for its own benefit. 32 Its geographic
position, so often used as a negative aspect of Turkey’s accession bid, creates the unique
situation where Turkey can act as a bridge between the EU and many other regions. As a
member of the EU, Turkey has much more incentive to cooperate and aid the EU in this

31
32

Interview with Dilek Cinar, 7 Nov 2008.
Dervis, Gros, Emerson and Ulgen, European Transformation, 49.
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manner than if the country is not accepted. Turkey has influence as well in the Caucasus.
With many Turkish speaking peoples in the region, Turkey can also aid the EU with the
logistics of communication. Also, Turkey’s bilateral, close relationships with countries
with similar cultural heritage would be an asset to the EU. In a region such as the
Southern Caucasus, which couples EU interest with its “unwillingness to take an active
lead” in shaping policy, Turkey can extend its influence with the goal of aiding its fellow
EU members and the larger EU foreign policy objectives. 33
In a security spectrum, Turkey also offers energy security for Europe. With its
geographical location so close to regions with large reserves of oil and natural gas,
Turkey serves as a conduit country for transporting these commodities between the
regions of origin and the markets of Europe. Turkey does not play as important a role in
regards to oil supply as gas; even so, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline pump a significant amount through Turkey’s borders, on to European
markets. 34 Turkey’s role in supplying natural gas is much more important for Europe.
With the West’s growing dependence on Russia’s gas sources, it is prudent for Europe to
wean itself from such a source and find alternatives, for the member states’ own stability
and security. Turkey’s location is near countries that hold roughly thirty five percent of
world gas reserves. 35 Russia holds about forty five percent of world reserves of natural
gas, which is currently supplied through the Blue Stream pipeline to Europe. 36 Turkey is
interested in building another pipeline that would import from the East and transport
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West; in doing so, the security of the European market would be “augmented by
diversification of pipeline supply routes through a completely safe transit region
[Turkey].” 37
Economically, Europe would burden the costs of Turkey’s accession for the
beginning years. Turkey needs to work to maintain or reach European economic
standards 38 . These costs would be internalized and paid for by the Turks. The benefits for
the EU include the opening of Turkey’s markets to European products, and the
availability of a young, educated work force that could invigorate the stalling European
economy. Turkey has made progress since its economy’s 2001 crash; the European
Commission recently recognized Turkey’s strides in fixing its economy, and despite
ongoing structural problems, its economy could now be considered a “functioning market
economy.” 39 Turkey’s gains in this field have been great, and Turkish officials are
confident that Turkey’s economy will continue to grow. If so, Turkey will not be an
economic burden on the EU in the future.
One of the most important aspects of Turkey’s accession is the clear message that
Turkey’s membership sends to the Muslim population, both of Europe and the rest of the
world. The EU’s identity has evolved through time, as evidenced through the expansion
of the EU into what was formerly part of the Soviet bloc, the acceptance of ‘new Europe’
into the same sphere as ‘old Europe,’ and changing demographics. There are increasing
numbers of Muslim minorities in many countries, especially France and Germany. This
affects Europe’s relationship with Turkey, an applicant country with a clear Muslim
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majority. The effects of a rejection of Turkey’s membership bid would reverberate all
around the world, but especially within Europe, carrying the message that Europe is a
“Christian Fortress” and not willing to open its doors to other religions or ways of life. 40
Such a message would also clearly state that those Muslims living within Europe’s
borders – many for decades - are not welcome there. Turkey’s membership would reject
such claims that a ‘clash of civilizations’ is eminent, and would represent the acceptance
of multiculturalism within Europe’s borders.
In summary, according to Sinan Ulgen, the chairman of EDAM, the EU would
benefit from Turkish membership in three main ways. 41 One, Turkey would augment the
EU’s existing global status and help create an EU that is a major world player. Two,
Turkey could increase Europe’s energy security through its role as an energy conduit
country. Three, Europe’s acceptance of Turkey would act as a powerful message to the
rest of the world of acceptance of multi-culturalism and the Muslim world. Each of these
reasons have been outlined above, and show that Turkey’s membership would benefit the
EU if the EU is ready and willing to continue its evolution towards a global player.

Section V: Benefits of membership for Turkey
Turkey has been firmly aligned with the West for over fifty years, actively
working with various international and Western oriented organizations since their
creation. Now, Turkey’s goal of truly being a member of the West has manifested itself
in Turkey’s drive to become a member of the EU, the political entity of the West. For
Turkey to become a member is for Turkey to be truly accepted as a member of the West,
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and fulfill the goals set forth by Turkey’s founding father, Ataturk. EU membership
represents the manifestation and acceptance of the identity that Turkey has worked to
build for years. This alignment with the West allowed the government in 1923 to create a
Western style democracy within its own borders. Such a government was a clear break
from the government under the Ottoman Empire, which ruled under a corrupt system of
blackmail and extortion. A continued support for Turkey’s current government is
important for it to survive.
The current government in power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), is a
reformist as well as Islamic political party, and has continued this Western oriented
Turkish identity through to today. The reforms the AKP has enacted in the last years have
been extensive, and while they have not yet been implemented fully, show a strong
willingness on Turkey’s part to comply with Western demands. Such a sentiment should
be encouraged. A postponement or rejection of Turkey’s accession process would have
detrimental effects on Turkey’s democracy. The reforms that have been put in place so
far will stall; those that might have taken place in the future will not longer if there is no
incentive. EU membership has been a clear motivator for the current government to
continue its reforms.
Economically, membership in the European Union does not bring great change to
Turkey’s economy in the short term as there has been a Customs Union between Turkey
and the EU since 1995. However, Turkey must comply with EU standards, which they
have signaled a willingness to do. The greatest effect will be on Turkey’s viability as an
investment state, particularly in the case of foreign direct investment. 42 International
bond investors have also increased their attentions towards Turkey under the urging of
42
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the EU. 43 Also, membership will eventually allow for less restricted movement for
potential workers. While this causes much consternation within the Turkish debate, this
‘flood’ of workers will actually be needed in many countries with declining populations,
and would provide jobs for those Turks in need of employment.
From a security perspective, Turkey is already integrated in the West with its
membership in NATO. However, with the evolution and expansion of the EU’s foreign
policy, most notably with the evolution of a common security and defense policy, Turkey
could gain from inclusive membership, especially as the EU looks to extend its power
further. Rather than being the ‘Other’, or the buffer state between either the EU and the
Middle East or the EU and Russia, Turkey would permanently be aligned within the EU’s
political and economic zone. Turkey has little interest in acting as a buffer state for the
large political and economic entity next door. 44 Such a position of combined foreign
policy goals would benefit both Turkey and EU; with Turkey as another faction of the
EU foreign policy, the EU would have the opportunity to extend its ‘zone of peace’ past
Turkey to unstable areas such as Iraq, thereby helping reduce the risk of instability
pouring over into Europe.

Section VI: Why the EU should not underestimate Turkish frustration
The Turkish people are frustrated with the continued rhetoric that can be found
throughout Europe that perhaps Turkey should be given a ‘privileged partnership’ instead
of full membership. Such ambiguous attitudes are dangerous and greatly affect public
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opinion of not only the EU but also the West. 45 The ‘wait and see’ attitude is detrimental
for a country such as Turkey that has put forth efforts to radically change its constitution
and civil society through series after series of reforms and seen little encouragement or
accolades. These reforms are not likely to continue if the incentive of membership is
taken away. The EU’s popularity in Turkey has dropped, with only 49% of the Turkish
population in favor of European Union membership, and only 26% of Turks thinking that
Turkey would ever join the EU. 46 As those in Europe continue to advocate a privileged
partnership with Turkey, those in Turkey begin to question louder and louder Turkey’s
place in Europe. 47 Turkey is a risky candidate for the EU, and its membership will
drastically change the future of the EU. However, many argue that the price of exclusion
is greater than the costs of inclusion. 48 While at the moment it is almost impossible to
imagine that Turkey would turn away from the West, continued ambiguity towards a
timeline for Turkey’s accession process as EU states find more and more reasons to deny
Turkish membership will only decrease Turkish support. There is widespread sentiment
that “…no matter what [the Turks] do, the EU will always find an excuse to prevent
Turkey’s accession.” 49 In such a case, Turkey could turn away from the West, from the
region that never fully accepted its identity. Such a shift away from the West will have
severe ramifications, both in regards to Turkey’s internal dynamic as well as Europe’s.
As Europe seeks to expand its role as a global power player, the effect of turning away
45
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such a strategically located country with strong military capability will have even greater
effects on this vision of a globally competitive Europe.
Short term effects of Turkey’s frustrations with the EU
Frustration’s regarding the EU could affect the current Turkish government’s
actions, especially its willingness to enact reforms. The AKP was elected with the
platform of democratic reform and the goal of EU membership. But, as the Turkish
public opinion turns away from that political goal, and some turn to rising nationalism in
response to EU demands, the future of the current Turkish government is in question.
Even as Turkey works towards complying with the Copenhagen Criteria and other EU
requests, there are sections of Turkish society that want to see the military step in and
restore Turkish sovereignty, which they see as threatened by EU membership. 50 As the
West drops in popularity, so does the bid for EU membership. Such doubts do not benefit
the current Western aligned government, and allows for the military to abuse their power
in the name of protecting the Turkish Republic.
If the current government loses its EU bid or the popular support to continue the
EU accession process, the reforms driven by the incentive of membership will no longer
occur, and it is likely that the already existing reforms will either not be implemented or
overturned. There is little reason for Turkey to continue its democratic process if the
main political organization representing Western, modern ideas refuses their request. A
rejection by the EU of Turkey, and classification of Turkey as a second class democracy
could cause the Turks to turn away from the West and therefore away from reform.
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More alarming are long term effects on Turkey’s future and identity. As the West
becomes more unpopular, a Western aligned democratic government will as well; there is
a legitimate fear that if Turkey loses its common identity with the West, it will lose its
democracy as well. 51 The Turkey that currently exists aligns itself with the West and
prides itself on its Islamic but secular democracy. Losing that part of their identity would
have drastic effects on the Turkish government. A shift of identity of that drastic a degree
will radically change the future of Turkish self identification and therefore society and
politics. Some predict that failed Turkish accession talks will open the door for a more
authoritarian government to take hold. 52 Such a government would represent a loss in
political power for the Turkish people, and a failure of the ‘Turkish model’ of
democracy. 53 Many wish to see the Turkish model fail, including non-democratic Islamic
governments, such as Iran. A collapse of Turkish democracy is a loss for the possibility
of an Islamic democracy.

Long term effects on Turkish-EU relations
If Turkey is not aligned with the West, then which way does the country turn?
Through the past few years, discussion of Turkey’s other options have become more
prevalent as the Turks’ frustrations with their treatment by the EU have grown. Following
are some of Turkey’s alternatives. In all of these instances, Turkey would surely maintain
tie with Europe, but not to the degree to which it does currently.
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Move towards Islam
Because of its cross-civilizational geographic location, history and culture,
Turkey has ties to many different parts of the modern world. Until the 1923 establishment
of the modern Turkish Republic, the preceding government held a strong connection with
Islam. With Ataturk’s revolution, the state abolished the Ottoman Empire’s religious
organization, the caliphate, and attempted to remove its influence on the government and
society. This transition to a secular society was not an option for its citizens, and those
that did not agree were not heard in the evolution of Turkey’s government. This
dissatisfaction held by some sectors of society with Ataturk’s secular vision for Turkey is
now supported by the recent revitalization of Islam in Turkey. The modern support for
Islam, however, is in a different form than the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire, and is
most clearly seen through the democratic Islamic party currently in power. Such an
emergence of Islam in Turkish society shows the possibility of a shift from the past 75
years of strained relations with the Middle East, due to Turkey’s close ties with the West.
Samuel Huntington points out, “at some point, Turkey could be ready to give up
its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West” and
turn back to its neighboring Islamic countries. 54 Turkey holds a strong geographical
position in the Middle East, and is one of the historical leaders in the region. The Islamic
nations have historically not been comfortable with relations with the West; Turkey could
assume the role as coordinator between Islamic and non-Islamic states and thereby
increase its own global position. Such a move towards the Islamic world could only occur
with a marked shift from the current secular nature of Turkey’s government to a more
Islamic, Middle Eastern oriented leadership willing to revolt against the established
54
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Turkish identity. A truly integrated acceptance of the Middle East is unlikely, as
traditionally, the Turks do not identify themselves with Arabs or Iranians. 55

Benevolent Regional Player
In correlation with the argument that Turkey would turn to Islam, there is the idea
that if Turkey were turned away from the EU by whichever measure – rejection,
frustration, ambiguity – it would retain its secular nature and current government but
would turn into a benevolent regional player in the Middle East. Turkey has options; if it
is not Europe, then Turkey needs only to turn around and there are opportunities to the
East as well. 56 Traditionally, Turkey is seen as one of the major three players in the
Middle East, along with Egypt and Iran. This is mainly due to its geographic location; as
a transition region, Turkey gains and retains more power. 57 Location is key for Turkey’s
options, and the Middle East is right next door.
Turkey has become more engaged and interested in the Middle Eastern region in
the past few years. The war in Iraq demanded more attention be placed on its politics and
conflicts. Turkey’s frustration with the United States’ actions in Northern Iraq in regards
to the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) created the need to coordinate on this issue with
other regional powers, specifically Iran and Syria. Turkey has also turned to the Middle
East an increasing amount for resolving other issues as well, which is contradicts the
Kemalist ideal of turning to the West for political actions, especially foreign affairs. The
reasons for such a shift are outlined in Larrabee’s article, and include the diversified
problems in the region, the deterioration of Turkish relations with the EU over the
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accession process and increased tension with the US over the Iraq war. 58 As Turkey has
shifted attention away from the West, ties with other regional powers have strengthened.
Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Syrian relations are better recently because of their shared
problems with Kurdish populations in each country. Also, Turkey serves as a conduit
country for energy supplies, both oil and natural gas, from Iran. These shared security
and economic problems have increased ties between the two to a higher degree than in
years past. This relationship is limited, especially in regards to the possibility of Iran
obtaining nuclear weapons. Turkey, a NATO member, is strongly opposed to this
occurring.
Beyond these examples, there has a deliberative effort on the part of Turkey’s
foreign policy to engage with its neighboring regions since 2002. The “zero problem
policy towards Turkey’s neighbors” implemented first in 2002 has greatly improved
relations with Syria and Georgia. 59 Turkey has also extended its diplomatic skills in
regional disputes. In 2004, Turkey’s Prime Minister spoke to both sides of the conflict in
Lebanon, and opened channels of diplomacy. Turkey has worked to better relations
between the Sunni-Shia Iraqis, actively opening means of communication between the
two sides and attempting to bridge the gaps between other nation’s rifts created by the
issue. Another Turkish foreign policy goal is to act as through “rhythmic diplomacy”
which involves working with international organizations and regional organizations other
than the EU. This marks an important shift in Turkey’s foreign policy to greater placed
importance on soft power, and away from hard power. Such an influence on soft power is
58
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evident in an analysis by Ahmet Davutoglu of foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Four key principles are outlined that dictate Turkey’s role in the region: the idea that
security is for everyone, so Turkey does have an important stake in others security in the
region; dialogue is the most important means of resolving conflict; increased economic
interdependence; and cultural coexistence.60 Turkey’s frustrations with the European
Union, and the West in general, have lead it to engage more often and in a more
meaningful way with its neighboring regions, especially strengthening relations with the
Middle East. This dual relationship, with the Middle East and the West, is an important
aspect to Turkey’s foreign policy and increases Turkey’s importance as a mediator. 61
However, one downside to Turkey’s integration into the Middle East and the
continuation of this process is that for Turkey, the Middle East holds little potential for
democratic or economic growth. Some argue that the Middle East will never replace
Europe in Turkey’s mindset; this draws on Turkey’s cultural identity and the respected
position that Europe and the West hold in the collective Turkish identity. 62 Many Turks
do not associate Turkish identity with the Middle East or Arabs; when posed with the
question of Turkey turning to the Middle East instead of Europe, those interviewed
agreed that it was only in a diplomatic or regional role. For them, Turkey is not the
Middle East. 63 According to Professor Tzimitras, this difference can be found in many
areas of culture. In schools, Turkey is taught as the Eastern part of a Western project,
instead of as a member of the Middle East. Turkey would never truly become a member
of the Middle East in the same way that it would like to become a member of the
60
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European Union because of its self-identity as a separate entity from the Middle East, and
so will Turkey will become involved in a self-interested, regional role. 64 These
evaluations are based on Turkey now. Turkey’s identity can change, as evidenced by the
revolution of 1923. While as argued before it is not in the Turkish people’s best interests
to turn to the Middle East, continued frustrations with Europe could continue to the point
where such a radical change could occur.

Russia as a ‘second Europe’
Another option for Turkey is to turn to another major global power, which is also
a close neighbor: Russia. Turkey’s strategic location would allow for it to act as “a centre
of power between Brussels, Moscow and the Middle East” 65 ; this relationship would also
allow for a combined control of the Caucasus and Central Asia, many of which countries
speak Turkish or have a common history with Turkey. The massive amount of area that
would be possible to strategically control would boost both Turkey’s and Russia’s global
dominance. 66 Such an alignment, however, could have political costs for the democracy
of Turkey. Turning to such an isolationist, authoritarian regime as in Russia could create
the same sentiments in Turkey, especially among the already prominent nationalistic
groups. 67 Such a relationship would create antagonism and competition between Turkey
and the EU, similar to the one that exists between Russia and the EU currently. Such a
turn would dramatically change the political scene in Turkey. Such a relationship could

64

See Interview with Prof. Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008.
O. Waever, “Europe's three empires: a Watsonian interpretation of post-wall European security” in: R.
Fawn, J. Larkins (Eds.), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered,
(London : MacMillan Press, , 1996), 238.
66
Interview with Prof Tzimitras, 6 Nov 2008
67
Interview with Sinan Ulgen, 5 Nov 2008.
65

34

increase Turkey’s regional role in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with Turkey working in
conjunction with Russia. Turkey would also benefit economically, with its already strong
trading partnership with Russia strengthening. Turkey could also act as a conduit country
for Russia’ natural resources even more than it does currently. Such a possible
relationship with Russia is debated, with some saying it is only a possibility if Turkish
politics shift away from its democratic path, and others saying the history of distrust and
suspicion between the two is too strong to overcome. 68

Conclusion
This examination of Turkish-EU relations reaches the end with the result that the
relationship is complicated, with Turkey’s attempt to join the EU spanning many decades
and with so many important issues tied up in one decision. This decision is crucial for the
developing identity of Turkey, of the EU and of Western relations with the Muslim
world. While there are those who have trepidations about Turkish membership, the price
of exclusion is higher than the cost of accession. The relationship between the two spans
so much time that to dismiss Turkey now is to dismiss half of the Turkish Republic’s
history. The EU is unlikely to out right dismiss Turkey. Instead, continued ambiguity by
the European Commission and calls against Turkish membership by member states, such
as France, will take its toll on Turkish enthusiasm. A realistic scenario is that a
government could come to power in Turkey that feeds off the Turk’s frustration and
suspicion of the West; such a government would not likely continue to reform the country
to conform with Western standards. Nor would such a government continue Turkey’s
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strong alliance with the West, therefore ending Turkey’s bid for membership. Such a
change would not reflect well on the EU; as Professor Djalili claims 69 , such a rejection
by the West – intentionally or through ambiguity and building frustrations - would be a
gift to fundamentalist Islamists everywhere.
In order to continue a beneficial relationship between both sides, the EU needs to
be honest and straight forward with Turkey. The European Commission’s message needs
to reflect the same measures as the European Parliament; the national governments need
to be supportive of the continuing relationship. It will take time for Turkey to meet
European standards; however, the feeling that Europe continues to enact double standards
against Turkey need to be erased through honest communication of what is expected
from Turkey. For Europe to do otherwise is to risk its relationship with Turkey and court
many dangerous possibilities. Turkey has other options. These options are not the best for
Turkey, for Turkish-EU relations, or the EU’s relations with the Muslim world, and so
the EU should continue to encourage Turkey’s efforts to reach membership
qualifications.
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